Abstract-To support large-scale biomedical research projects, organizations need to share person-specific genomic sequences without violating the privacy of their data subjects. In the past, organizations protected subjects' identities by removing identifiers, such as name and social security number; however, recent investigations illustrate that deidentified genomic data can be "reidentified" to named individuals using simple automated methods. In this paper, we present a novel cryptographic framework that enables organizations to support genomic data mining without disclosing the raw genomic sequences. Organizations contribute encrypted genomic sequence records into a centralized repository, where the administrator can perform queries, such as frequency counts, without decrypting the data. We evaluate the efficiency of our framework with existing databases of single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) sequences and demonstrate that the time needed to complete count queries is feasible for real world applications. For example, our experiments indicate that a count query over 40 SNPs in a database of 5000 records can be completed in approximately 30 min with off-the-shelf technology. We further show that approximation strategies can be applied to significantly speed up query execution times with minimal loss in accuracy. The framework can be implemented on top of existing information and network technologies in biomedical environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE PRACTICE of medicine is evolving toward personalized health care [1] . Already, findings from pharmacogenomic investigations indicate that variations in an individual's genotype influence the uptake and metabolism of pharmaceuticals [2] , [3] . However, to realize cost-effective specialized services, scientists need to characterize the influence of genomic variation over a wide array of health features, such as clinical diagnostics and treatment response [4] . The integration of modern technologies into biomedical environments has enabled the collection of detailed genomic and clinical records [5] , but the quantity of data necessary to conduct personalization studies is often beyond the capabilities of an individual researcher or institution [6] . As such, it is necessary for scientists to share private data collections in support of research on a larger scale. To facilitate data sharing, organizations in various countries, in-cluding Estonia, Iceland, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States are establishing data repositories that centralize person-specific biomedical records for research purposes [7] - [9] .
Despite the potential benefits to health care, person-specific genomic records must be shared in a manner that preserves the anonymity of the data subjects. This requirement is rooted in both social concerns and public policy. Many people fear that sensitive information learned from their medical and genomic records will be misused or abused [10] , [11] . To mitigate such concerns, many countries have enacted policies that limit the sharing of a subject's genomic information in a personally identifiable form. In the United States, for instance, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) is drafting policy that will require scientists to share genomic data studied with NIH funding once "identifiable information" has been removed [12] .
Consider the following scenario. Alice is a principle investigator located at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center and Bob is a principle investigator located at the Vanderbilt University Medical Center. Both Alice and Bob are independently funded by the NIH to collect data from hospital patients and conduct genome wide association studies on Alzheimer's disease. To comply with the NIH policy, at the completion of their studies, Alice and Bob need to share their data collections to a centralized repository, so that researchers around the country, such as Charlie at the National Institute on Aging can perform scientific investigations on the integrated data, such as "How many records contain a diagnosis of juvenile Alzheimer's and gene variant X?" How can Alice and Bob share the biomedical records so that biomedical researchers can conduct their scientific investigations without revealing the identities of the data subjects? To summarize the problem, data collectors, such as Alice and Bob need to satisfy two goals when sharing genomic data:
1) data utility: the data should be useful for scientific investigations; 2) data privacy: the data should not reveal the subjects ' identities. Often, these goals are considered to be contradictory and existing privacy methods tend to favor one over the other. In this paper, however, we demonstrate that utility and privacy goals can be simultaneously satisfied for specific scientific endeavors.
A. Genomic Data Privacy Techniques and Their Limitations
What is it about genomic data that makes it "identifiable"? To date, various privacy protection strategies have been designed to remove identifying information prior to sharing genomic data. For the most part, existing genomic data privacy techniques can be roughly grouped into two approaches with distinct benefits and drawbacks: 1) data deidentification and 2) data augmentation.
Privacy protections based on "deidentification" advocate the removal, or encryption, of person-specific identifiers, such as name and social security number, initially associated with genomic records [13] - [17] . Deidentification enables data collectors to disclose all genomic information that has been collected, but it is an ad hoc process and provides no guarantees of privacy protection. In fact, it was recently shown that in many cases, knowledge gleaned from deidentified genomic data can be exploited to "reidentify" records to named subjects in publicly accessible resources through simple automated methods [18] .
Data augmentation techniques provide exact guarantees of privacy protection. As an example, consider that a prime factor in reidentification is that a subject's DNA is uniquely distinguishable. In particular, experimental evidence indicates that less than 75 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), features common to genomic studies, are sufficient to uniquely distinguish a subject's DNA record in a population [19] . A formal model of privacy protection that addresses uniqueness is the generalization of a subject's DNA sequence so that the resulting record is indistinguishable from other shared records [20] , [21] . For instance, the DNA sequences AACTAA and AAGTAC can be generalized to the common AA[C or G]TA [A or C] . Privacy protection based on generalization is controlled by varying the number of records that are rendered indistinguishable. Though generalization formally prevents data reidentification, it changes the genomic records in ways that may limit their scientific usefulness.
B. Contributions of This Research
In this paper, we propose an alternative approach to genomic data privacy protection that is based on cryptography. Our model ensures that: 1) the data utility of protected records is equivalent to that achieved by deidentification and 2) the data privacy is equivalent to that achieved by data augmentation schemes.
As an overview, our model works as follows. Data holders Alice and Bob transmit encrypted versions of their records to a third party's data repository. The repository administrator executes queries on behalf of Charlie the researcher without decrypting any of the records. The results of the query are then sent to a third party who decrypts the aggregation of the result (i.e., How many records satisfied the query criteria?) and sends the answer to the scientist. This architecture incorporates two different third parties for security-related benefits. There is no opportunity to decrypt the data unless both third parties collaborate. As a result, the use of multiple third parties ensures that there is no single point of data compromise. Thus, if a hacker breaks into one of the third party's computer systems, the hacker cannot learn the sensitive information in the encrypted records.
Recognize that though the data remains encrypted at all times, the results of queries themselves can violate privacy requirements. For instance, if the answer to Charlie's query is such that there is only one record with DNA sequence "AATCAATGAA" and juvenile Alzheimer's disease, then Charlie has uniquely pinpointed an individual's record. Thus, it is necessary for the third party to ensure that query results, or the combination of a series of query results issued by a researcher, do not permit the triangulation of an individual's record. This process, known as query restriction, is necessary to ensure that our framework achieves identity protection; however, this topic has been studied extensively in the database security community [22] , and thus, we neglect the presentation of query restriction in this paper.
The main contribution of our model is in the analysis of encrypted genomic data. To the best of our knowledge, there is no off-the-shelf product or literature that can be applied to satisfy this component of the framework. As such, this paper focuses on the cryptographic protocols that are necessary to build and query encrypted genomic databases. In addition, we provide experimental validation so that in our framework, queries can be answered efficiently for real world biomedical applications.
II. METHODS
The goal of our research is to create a system that simultaneously: 1) stores DNA sequences in a database securely, 2) supports querying tasks that would be performed on the original sequences, 3) facilitates the DNA data holders to submit their records to our system without ever knowing the secret keys that can be used to decrypt the encrypted data, and 4) prevents a single point of failure to ensure that if a hacker breaks into any single site, he/she will not be able to learn the confidential DNA data. To achieve these goals, we designed an architecture that incorporates four types of participants: data holders, data users, a DS, and a KHS. In Fig. 1 , we depict the relationship of these participants and a broad overview of the architecture.
For illustrative purposes, let us extend the scenario posed in Section I to correspond with the proposed framework. Imagine that the set of data holders are a set of hospitals (e.g., Vanderbilt University Medical Center and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center) and that the set of data users are biomedical researchers (e.g., Charlie from the National Institute on Aging). For this research, we assume each hospital maintains one or more DNA records and that all hospitals collect records on the same set of attributes (i.e., the same regions of the genome). Recall, in the earlier scenario, the data holders need to share the data with a third party for public dissemination purposes, which in the context of genome wide association studies in the United States will be the NIH. Yet, notice that in our framework, we incorporate two third parties: a data storage site (DS) and a key holder site (KHS). The additional third party is crucial to the security of the framework. The DS is where encrypted DNA is stored and processed, whereas KHS manages the cryptographic keys that are used for encryption and decryption of the genomic records stored in a database at DS, as well as the query results to biomedical researchers. Thus, if one of the third parties is compromised (e.g., a hacker breaks into the system), the decrypted DNA records are not revealed.
The distribution of the role of the third party provides additional benefits. In particular, notice that the majority of data management is pushed onto DS, whereas KHS serves as a final point of control in the system. Given the status of KHS, we recommend that the original third party, i.e., the NIH, plays the role of KHS. Now that we have mapped our participants from the original scenario to roles in the secure framework, the question remains, "Who plays the the role of DS?" This question can be qualified by recognizing that DS is constrained by several factors. First, the DS must be a trusted entity with no data of its own at stake, so that there is no conflict of interest. Second, the DS must have sufficient storage and bandwidth capacity in managing large databases with simultaneous access. We believe that this role can be assumed by a specialized information management company that is contractually bound to DS for liability purposes.
In the context of this paper, we assume that the participants are noncolluding and semihonest. By noncolluding, we mean that participants do not share information related to the protocol. Semihonest implies that all participants correctly follow the protocols, but they are free to use whatever information they see during the execution of the protocols in any way they choose. For a detailed description of the semihonest model in the context of formal security architectures, we refer the reader to [23] . We address the appropriateness of such assumptions in Section IV.
Before describing the details of the system architecture, we present several basic principles regarding the cryptographic protocols that we employ. For reference, Table I provides notations and abbreviations that we use throughout this paper.
A. Data Representation
Given a cryptographic basis, we need to define a mechanism by which genomic sequence data are encrypted. Since genomic sequence data are represented by the four letter alphabet of nucleotides {A, C, G, T }, each letter can be represented as a pair of bits and each genomic sequence can be represented as a series of binary values. For instance, Table II provides a mapping from a nucleotide alphabet to a two-bit binary value. Table III presents four DNA sequence samples (with a size of three nucleotides) in forms of the four letter alphabet and the corresponding binary representations, which are based on the mapping in Table II.  Table IV shows how each record is encrypted using public 
B. Cryptographic Basics
To achieve a simple and flexible architecture, we utilize a "semantically secure" homomorphic public-key encryption (HPE) scheme. In an HPE scheme, each participant maintains a pair of cryptographic keys: a private key and a public key. Generally speaking, a participant keeps the private key secret and publicly publishes the public key. For example, if Alice wants to send a message, or plaintext, to DS, Alice can encrypt the message into "ciphertext" using DS's public key. The ciphertext can only be decrypted by the corresponding private key, so DS is the only entity that can decipher the message from Alice.
An encryption scheme is said to be semantically secure [24] if it is infeasible for an adversary, with finite computational capability, to extract information about a plaintext when in possession of the ciphertext and the corresponding public encryption key. The semantic security property implies that even the repeated encryption of the same message will be indistinguishable to an eavesdropper on the communication. In other words, if Alice and Bob both encrypt the same genomic sequence, say "GTC" (θ Table II ) using DS's public key, then the resulting ciphertexts E pk (θ h 3 ) and E pk (θ h 4 ) are different in binary format, e.g., "010111011100" is not equal to "110011100101."
The HPE scheme we adopt in our architecture must be probabilistic and possess an additive homomorphic property. Informally, the additive homomorphic property allows us to compute the encrypted sum of two plaintext values through the corresponding ciphertext values. More formally, let E pk (.) denote the encryption function with public key pk and D pr (.) denote the decryption function with private key pr. An HPE scheme is probabilistic and additive homomorphic if the encryption function satisfies the following requirements.
1) Constant multiplication: Given a constant k and the encryption E pk (m) of m, there exists an efficient algorithm to compute the public key encryption of km, denoted E pk (km) := k × h E pk (m) (here × h represents the multiplication operation of an encrypted value with a constant). 2) Probabilistic: If a message is encrypted twice with very high probability (almost 1), the two ciphertexts are different. For example, given a message m, c 1 = E pk (m) and c 2 = E pk (m), there is a high probability that c 1 = c 2 and
and E pk (m 2 ) of m 1 and m 2 , there exists an efficient algorithm to compute the public key encryption of m 1 + m 2 , denoted E pk (m 1 + m 2 ) := E pk (m 1 ) + h E pk (m 2 ) (here + h represents the addition operation of two encrypted values). The techniques we present in this paper can be applied within any additive HPE schemes, such as [25] - [28] . Note that RSA [29] is multiplicative homomorphic; as a result, it cannot be used in our framework. In addition, commonly known private key encryption schemes, such as [30] and [31] , do not possess any homomorphic properties, so they are not applicable as well. Also, as we show in the next section, by using HPE systems, we do not need to decrypt the sensitive DNA data to answer certain queries. This is important because at any given time, if a hacker attacks any single site, he/she will not be able to learn the original sensitive DNA data. Unfortunately, this is not the case with private key encryption schemes such as [30] and [31] . These private key encryption schemes require the decryption of the encrypted data for query processing, which creates a potential vulnerability that hackers could exploit to learn the sensitive DNA values by attacking a single site. In our HPE framework, we can prove that any attack that involves single site will not be successful in learning the sensitive DNA data. In this paper, we adopt the Paillier cryptosystem [28] for empirical analysis because it is efficient in comparison to other additive HPE systems. For completeness, we next provide a brief description of the homomorphic cryptosystem that we adopt for this paper. A Paillier cryptosystem that satisfies the aforementioned properties can be defined as follows.
1) Key generation: Let p and q be prime numbers where p < q and p does not divide q − 1. For the Paillier encryption scheme, we set the public key pk to n where n = pq and private key pr to (λ, n) where λ is the lowest common multiplier of p − 1, q − 1. 2) Encryption with the public key: Given n, the message m, and a random number r from 1 to n − 1, encryption of the message m is calculated as follows: E pk (m) = (1 + n) m r n mod n 2 . 3) Decryption with the private key: Given n, the cipher text c = E pk (m), we calculate the D pr (c) as follows:
Given the encryption of m 1 and m 2 , E pk (m 1 ) and E pk (m 2 ), we calculate the E pk (m 1 + m 2 ) as follows:
Note, due to the modular operation, ciphertext addition yields E pk (m 1 + m 2 mod n). 5) Multiplying a ciphertext with a constant (× h ): Given a constant k and the encryption of m 1 , E pk (m 1 ), we calculate k × h E pk (m 1 ) as follows:
C. Security Framework
Here, we walk through the framework and describe how the cryptographic features are used to create and query a database of encrypted DNA sequences. Fig. 1 provides a high-level perspective of the process.
Step 1 (Key generation): In the first step of the protocol, KHS provides DS with a public key.
Step 2 (Data encryption): When Alice is ready to share her DNA sequences, DS sends Alice its public key. Alice then encrypts her genomic records using the public key and sends the results to DS. From a practical standpoint, we recommend that Alice assigns each record a unique identifier for update purposes. Thus, if Alice wants to append information, or correct errors that exist in records stored at DS, she does not have to resend the entire data collection. Instead, she can communicate the new information to DS, who can then amend or replace the appropriate records. It is at DS where the encrypted data will be queried and mined by biomedical researchers. We assume that DS can validate the legitimacy of the encrypted genomic sequences from each of the data holders. Note, it is necessary to specify authentication and access control mechanisms so that only authorized data holders can send their data to DS. We recommend building our framework on top of existing authentication and access control mechanisms. Though necessary in application, these issues are beyond the scope of this paper and are addressed elsewhere. We refer the reader to [32] for general architectures and [33] and [34] for implementation examples in biomedical settings.
Step 3 (Query issuance):
The set of queries that can be issued are known to Charlie, the biomedical researcher. After the data are encrypted and stored at DS, Charlie can send a query for the database to DS. In Section II-D, we define an example of the types of queries that can be issued.
Step 4 (Query processing): Based on the query received, the DS performs the requested computations and sends the intermediate encrypted results to KHS.
Step 5 (Result decryption): Using the private key, the KHS decrypts the result and sends it back to Charlie. Since data stored at DS are semantically secure, the DS can learn the contents of the encrypted data only when in possession of the corresponding private key. Yet, the DS does not know the corresponding private key because KHS keeps it secret. The KHS only issues DS a public key. Therefore, the data stored at DS are inherently secure against DS and researchers, such as Charlie. Nonetheless, to ensure a secure protocol within the proposed architecture, we need to prevent the private data from leaking to KHS. We prove this with respect to queries and aggregate results in the following section. Also note that in our framework, all the necessary cryptographic operations could be achieved in the background in such a way that Alice, Bob, and Charlie do not need to know any cryptographic details.
D. Secure Count Queries
One of the most common tasks that genome-based researchers need to perform is to determine how many samples satisfy certain characteristics. For example, researchers are interested in learning if there exist associations between various SNPs in the DSP1 gene and an individual's diagnosis with Alzheimer's disease [35] . Similar SNP-disease association studies are becoming common in human genomics research [36] , [37] . The architecture described earlier provides a framework for the integration of databases from disparate data holders, so that biomedical researchers may conduct research investigations over databases of larger populations. Yet, from a data mining perspective, for a researcher to discover association rules, he needs to learn the frequency of each itemset, e.g., the combination of values over a set of SNPs. The support of an itemset (e.g., SNP 1 = A ∧ SNP 2 = T ∧ Alzheimer's Diagnosis = Positive) can be found by first counting the number of records the itemset occurs in, and then, normalizing this quantity by the total number of records in the database. Other data mining tools, such as Naive Bayes models, Bayesian networks, and decision trees can also be learned by calculating the frequencies of certain events.
Frequencies for standard data mining applications can be calculated through traditional count queries. Unfortunately, count queries were not designed to be executed over homomorphically encrypted data. So, how can a database answer a count query on encrypted values without decrypting the data? In this section, we describe a SECURE-COUNT protocol that securely calculates the frequency of user-specified patterns without decrypting the data stored by DS.
In many cases, the genomic data under investigation corresponds to a set of SNPs, each of which can be represented as a binary variable [38] . Without loss of generality, we assume the underlying genomic sequences consist only of SNPs, such that the database contains only binary values. Let us elaborate on the earlier example: Charlie wants to learn how many records at DS contain a particular combination of SNPs, such that {SNP j 1 = A ∧ · · · ∧ SNP j k = T } where j 1 , . . . , j k is an arbitrary subsequence of a DNA data. Recall, we mapped nucleotides to bits, so A = b 1 and T = b k . Thus, such queries are represented as: SECURE-COUNT σ SNP j 1 =b 1 ∧···∧SNP j k =b k .
To evaluate the query, the DS needs to calculate if In our architecture, the DS only has access to the E pk (θ h i j ) values, i.e., the encrypted SNPs. Though homomorphic encryption enables the addition of two encryptions modulo n, for a large n, it is nontrivial to compute a Boolean formula [39] . To prevent unrealistic computation times, the DS can check if the selection condition is satisfied for a given encrypted genomic sequence by converting it to an algebraic equation that can be calculated using the fundamental properties of homomorphic encryption. In Appendix I, we prove that the selection conditions can be satisfied in an algebraic form. Using the results given in Appendix I, our secure count protocol can be divided into two major parts. Using the DS-Count protocol, the DS calculates the algebraic equations on the encrypted data. Similarly, using the KHS-Count protocol, the KHS can decrypt the results of the algebraic equations to calculate the final query result. The DS-Count and KHS-Count protocols leverage the following observations. 1) If a selection condition is satisfied for θ h i , then the sum of SNP j 1 to SNP j t must be equal to t and the sum of all other SNP values must be zero. 2) Given two random nonzero values r 1 , r 2 mod n, if a 1 r 1 + a 2 r 2 = 0 mod n, then a 1 = 0 and a 2 = 0 with high probability (see Appendix I). Using these observations, for each θ h i , the DS calculates: 1) the sum of the encrypted SNP j 1 to SNP j t values minus t and 2) the sum of all the other encrypted SNP values using homomorphic encryption. The DS then multiplies each of the previous summations with some random values r 1 and r 2 . Using the second observation given earlier, the KHS can ascertain whether a selection condition is satisfied or not with high probability. At the same time, the KHS does not learn anything other than the final result because the DS randomly orders the algebraic equation results.
Protocol 1 details the algorithm by which DS and KHS can answer a count query issued by a biomedical researcher. In this protocol,
, which is the sum of the ath through the bth bits of the SNP sequence. First, the DS calculates the (S(i) 2 mod n values for each SNP sequence using the homomorphic encryption properties. More specifically, in protocol 1, the DS first calculates the encrypted sum of all SNP j 1 to SNP j t values [i.e., E pk (S(i) 
E. Communication and Computation Complexity
Let us assume there are α encrypted genomic sequences stored at DS, the size of a query from a biomedical researcher is k, and s is the number of bits necessary to represent n. Since k is a much smaller value than a randomly chosen value r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a single exponentiation with the exponent r is more expensive than k multiplications. Therefore, to characterize the upper bound of the computational complexity, we calculate the number of exponentiations required by the SECURE-COUNT protocol (protocol 1).
First, there are two exponentiations required for each encrypted genomic sequence, so the number of exponentiations for the SECURE-COUNT protocol is bounded by O(α), or the total number of encrypted genomic sequences. Second, the DS sends α encrypted query results to KHS, and each encrypted value is at most s-bits long. Thus, the communication complexity of the SECURE-COUNT protocol is bounded by O(αs) bits, or O ("the total number of DNA records" times "the length of the encrypted result").
III. RESULTS
The prior section defined the framework and how queries are executed within the framework. In this section, we prove that the framework is both secure and handles queries efficiently for small datasets. For large datasets, we prove that the query run-time can be approximated with minimal information loss.
A. Security Analysis
In this research, we assume that the security of a DNA sequence is compromised if the DNA sequence is revealed, or inferred, by a participant, given the observed information. Formally, we define security from the perspective of secure multiparty computation (see Definition 3.1 given later). Let us orient this definition in the context of the SECURE-COUNT protocol. 1 Recognize that the result R of the query issued by Charlie, which KHS receives from DS, consists of encryptions of either 0's or random values. As a consequence, it can be proven that KHS can only learn the query result, i.e., the number of 0-encryptions, but nothing else regarding the encrypted data stored at DS. In the context of biomedical research, Definition 3.1 states that if we can simulate what a participant sees during the execution of the protocol using only the participant's input and the final result, then the participant could not have learned anything beyond what it already knew. In the case of the SECURE-COUNT protocol, the input for DS corresponds to encrypted SNPs and Charlie's query. The output for DS corresponds to the encrypted count query result. To show that DS learned nothing other than the final result, we will show that what DS has seen during the execution of the secure count protocol can be simulated by its input and the final output.
To formally prove the security of the SECURE-COUNT protocol, we adopt the simulation argument defined in Definition 3.1. Recognize that DS only sees the encrypted genomic sequences, query, and the encrypted query result. Therefore, what DS sees can be simulated in polynomial time. Now, we need to show that, from KHS's point of view, the execution image of the SECURE-COUNT protocol can be simulated, and the simulated execution image is computationally indistinguishable from the actual execution image. Protocol 3 provides such a simulator. Protocol 3 generates encrypted R values based on public key (pk), the domain size of ciphertexts (n), and the total number of encrypted DNA sequences (α).
Let Π S be the view produced from the simulator, then according to protocol 3, Π S = R . Let Π R be the view during the actual execution of the SECURE-COUNT protocol, then corresponding to protocol 2, Π R = R. Note that in the actual execution of the protocol, R is the set of encrypted algebraic formula results for each θ h i and KHS receives R from DS. We will show that KHS does not learn anything other than the final result by proving that Π S and Π R are indistinguishable. In other words, we will show that the protocol execution can be simulated by only KHS's input and the output. To prove Π S and Π R are computationally indistinguishable, we first prove the following claim.
Claim 3.1: The distributions of R and R are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof: Let α be the number of encrypted genomic sequences, and without loss of generality, assume R = (R 1 , . . . , R α ) are identically distributed random variables drawn from some distribution F n and R = (R 1 , . . . , R α ) are identically distributed random variables drawn from some distribution F n . Because the encryption scheme E pk is semantically secure, R i and R i (1 ≤ i ≤ α) are computationally indistinguishable. In addition, both R 1 , . . . , R α and R 1 , . . . , R α are polynomial-time constructible (or can be produced in polynomial time). Therefore, based on the polynomial-time sampling theorem presented in [23] , R 1 , . . . , R α is computationally indistinguishable from R 1 , . . . , R α .
The variables R and R differentiate between Π R from Π S ; however, based on Claim 3.1, Π S is computationally indistinguishable from Π R . As a consequence, the SECURE-COUNT protocol satisfies Definition 3.1. This result implies that what KHS has seen during the execution of the secure count protocol could be simulated by its input and the final count query result. Therefore, the protocol execution does not provide any new knowledge to KHS that could not be inferred by the final result.
B. Experimental Run-Time Analysis
Since the commencement of the Human Genome Project, researchers have reported great numbers of SNPs. The availability of quality SNP markers makes candidate-gene, candidateregion, and whole-genome association studies possible. Linkage disequilibrium (LD) techniques have been widely applied for developing high-quality SNP marker maps [40] , [41] . When applied to disease-gene mapping, LD is evaluated through association analysis that requires the comparison of allele or haplotype frequencies between the affected (e.g., diagnosis of Alzheimer) and the control individuals (e.g., no diagnosis of Alzheimer). Toivonen et al. [38] proposed a data mining method for LD mapping called haplotype pattern mining (HPM).
We evaluate the efficiency and accuracy of HPM within our framework. Following the work of [38] , we use a simulated SNP dataset that was applied in their evaluation of the HPM algorithm. The dataset was generated with the following characteristics. First, an isolated founder population with an initial size of 300 was grown to 100 000 individuals over a course of 500 simulated years. Each individual's sequence was assigned one pair of homologous chromosomes, the length of each was 100 cM. Marker loci were simulated with a density of 3 SNPs per 1 cM nucleotides. The frequency of each SNP allele was set to 0.5. The goal of the HPM algorithm is to determine, for a given threshold x and a set of patterns P , if ±χ 2 (P ) ≥ x is true or not. Given the disease-associated chromosomes (A) and control chromosomes (C) that either match a given pattern (P ) or not (N ), then ±χ 2 (P ) is defined as
where δ ij is the number of chromosomes with properties i and j, δ i is the number of chromosomes with property i, and δ is the total number of chromosomes. Since ±χ 2 (P ) is contingent only on relative frequencies, it can be calculated using count queries. To evaluate HPM in the context of a distributed environment, such as a set of hospitals, we combine a number of simulated datasets as used in [38] , where each dataset contains 400 genomic sequence records, or chromosomes. Each record contains more than 300 SNPs represented in binary form.
We implemented our protocols in Java and ran our experiments on an off-the-shelf desktop with an Intel Pentium D 3.4 GHz processor with 2 GB memory. We used 1024 bit Paillier encryption for our experiments; n is 1024 bits long in our computations. In practice, we envision that there will exist a fast network connection between DS and KHS. Thus, to simplify our analysis, our implementation simulated DS and KHS on the same computer.
In our secure count query experiments, we used four binary datasets with 5000, 10 000, 15 000, and 20 000 tuples and four different query sizes that involve 10, 20, 30, and 40 binary attributes. Fig. 2 shows the execution time of each count query in minutes. For instance, in a database of 5000 records and a query that consists of 10 SNPs, the query will complete in approximately 25 min.
For the binary attributes, the SECURE-COUNT protocol requires only two exponentiations. At the same time, the number of attributes does not change the number of exponentiations. Rather, it only affects the number of homomorphic additions. Since each exponentiation is almost 1000 times more expensive than a homomorphic addition, a small increase in the number of attributes in the query does not significantly affect the execution time. As expected, execution time is linear in the number of tuples. Thus, when we increase our query to 40 SNPs on a database of 5000 records, the execution time increases to approximately 30 min. Unfortunately, the privacy protection provided by our architecture is not free. The same queries executed on the unencrypted data has running time that changes from 1 to 3 s. This increase in running time is due to expensive cryptographic operations.
The performance of the architecture is also influenced by the length of keys used for encryption and decryption. To investigate the effect of the key length, we repeated the experiments using queries that involve 20 SNPs on 10 000 records for varying key sizes. Fig. 3 shows that as the key size increases, the running time increases significantly. This result is not surprising because, as discussed earlier, the number of exponentiations is the dominating factor in the execution time. Specifically, we know that the exponentiation time in terms of key size k has a computational complexity O(k 3 ) [42] . Since increasing the key size may have a significant effect on the running time, the key size must be chosen carefully. We believe that 1024 bit keys gives a good tradeoff between running time and security. According to our Java implementation, it requires 120 min to run queries on 20 000 SNP sequences. Since our experiments show a linear relationship between number of records versus running time, we can easily estimate running time for different number of records using our experimental results. While such execution times may seem long, for research purposes, the efficiency can be improved using more specialized engineering. For instance, we piloted a more efficient implementation in the C programming language with a GMP library and decreased the exponentiation times by eightfold in comparison to the Java implementation. This implies that count queries over 50 000 binary data could be executed in approximately 35 min using more efficient implementations.
C. Sampling for Efficient Count Queries
It is acceptable to improve an algorithm's efficiency through specialized code and more powerful hardware when the size of the database is expected to remain constant. However, as biomedical research investigations become more complex and the quantity of population-based data grows, it will be necessary to derive more efficient procedures for secure query execution. In this section, we illustrate how approximation strategies can be used to speed up a secure count query without sacrificing accuracy. Our results with a simple sampling strategy show that running count queries over 50 000 randomly chosen SNP sequences may be sufficient to precisely estimate the original count query result.
Let i /α to be the true frequency of the tuples that satisfies the selection criteria of the count query Q. In other words, the result of the count query Q is f Q α. Now let us calculate the result to our query by using random q SNP sequences chosen with replacement from the original α sequences. Letf Q be the estimated count f Q using q randomly chosen SNP sequences. The Hoeffding inequality [43] implies Theorem 3.1, which bounds the probability where the difference between the query's true result and the approximated result is greater than a configurable parameter .
Therom 3.1 [43] : Given f Q andf Q calculated over q random samples, for any > 0
To better understand the implications of the aforementioned theorem, consider the following example. Assume that we have a research database that has one million SNP sequences in it. Also assume that we choose q = 50 000 and = 0.007. Furthermore, using the random 50 000 samples, assume that we observe 14 000 of the sampled sequences satisfy the query criteria. Based on the aforementioned observation, we estimate that the query is satisfied with frequency 14 000/50 000 = 0.28. Using Theorem 3.1, we know that the true frequency is between 0.273 and 0.287 with probability close to 1. This means that the actual number of sequences that satisfy the query will be in the range 0.273 × 10 6 = 273 000 and 0.287 × 10 6 = 287 000 with very high probability.
This theorem is useful because it provides biomedical researchers and administrators the opportunity to weigh the costs and benefits of run-time versus error. For instance, in the previous example, when we set q = 50 000 SNP sequences and = 0.007, we can calculate an upper bound of the probability that error is bigger than . Fig. 4 shows the change in the upper bound probability for varying values for q = 50 000. As the figure indicates, for values near 0.007, the upper bound on the probability that error is bigger than approaches zero. This result indicates that, through sampling-based approaches, we can securely compute a highly accurate estimate of a count query's result in a reasonable amount of time.
IV. DISCUSSION
The proposed framework and the associated query illustrate how genomic data can be collected and queried in an encrypted manner. There are several limitations to the current implementation, however, which we now address.
A. Issues of Trust
In the proposed framework, we assumed that all participants are noncolluding and semihonest, such that they execute the protocol correctly, but may use what they observe to learn more than what they knew at the start of the protocol. In essence, collusion is only a problem when the DS colludes with the KHS. Thus, the trustworthiness of the system is completely dependent on our ability to trust the third parties. In biomedical and health care environments, a requirement of trust in third parties is not an unreasonable assumption. For instance, there are many real world applications where semihonest behavior is expected, such as daily administrative activities that take place between health care providers and insurance agencies providing reimbursement for patient care. In such cases, we assume that the insurance agency does not supply a patient's medical information to a nonprovider. In the context of genomic data privacy protection, third parties have been proposed in real world applications [14] , [16] .
Nevertheless, collusion between the DS and KHS can be prevented to a certain degree by utilizing "threshold decryption". The main idea behind this concept is that the private key can be distributed between n entities, and decryption can only be performed successfully when at least t out of these n, where 1 ≤ t ≤ n, entities provide their portion of the key [44] . In other words, any subset of these entities, whose size is less than t, cannot decrypt the ciphertext that is encrypted via the corresponding public key. Therefore, collusion can only be achieved when there are more than t malicious entities who have shares of the private key. In general, the larger the values t and n are, the more difficult the collusion can succeed.
In addition, we recognize that the potential exists for participants in our architecture to deviate from the protocol to learn information. In the event that participants require more strict protections, we note that any semihonest protocol can be transformed to account for "malicious behavior" [23] . Yet, if a semihonest protocol is transformed into a malicious-resistant protocol using a generic model, the increased quantity of computation necessary to secure a protocol from malicious participants is often beyond what is acceptable for real world applications. A more reasonable and computationally feasible model of protection is not to prevent malicious behavior, but to detect when such behavior has occurred, so that we may hold culprits accountable for their actions. Recent research has demonstrated that such models can be designed for simple data mining applications [45] . In the future, we anticipate applying such methods in our architecture.
B. From Theory to Practice
This paper focused on the theoretical basis of a cryptographic framework for genomic data privacy. For this approach to be applied in the real world, it must be integrated into the wide variety of information technology infrastructures that are emerging in biomedical environments. One of the drawbacks of the theoretical presentation of our solution is that most biomedical sites have minimal experience in the integration of such a framework in their infrastructure. We believe that such a dilemma is relatively easy to overcome.
Though this paper adopted a theoretical approach, we have presented our research in a platform-independent nature. The primary reason for doing so is that we do not believe each site will need to redevelop the framework for their infrastructure. Rather, we are confident that our framework can be implemented on top of existing information infrastructures. As such, we believe that a generic implementation can be developed, in which existing infrastructures can set the appropriate inputs to the framework, and then, let the system run in the background.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a cryptographic framework by which person-specific genomic sequence data can be stored and queried in an encrypted setting. In contrast to formal privacy models for genomic data that "perturb" or "generalize" records, our methods ensure that data are shared in its most specific state. We demonstrated that the architecture can support frequency counts without decrypting the genomic sequences. Beyond a theoretical basis, we experimentally validated that the architecture is efficient, in terms of time required for query processing, for real world applications. Though this research presented a secure framework, it does not address privacy violations that can be extracted from the query results. This can be handled through query restriction models, and we intend on addressing this issue in future work.
APPENDIX I ALGEBRAIC VERIFICATION OF A SELECTION CONDITION
In Section II-D, we claimed that DS can accurately compute the count result for a biomedical researcher's query without decrypting the stored SNP sequences. In this section, we prove this claim and illustrate how DS can use algebraic properties of the homomorphic encryption scheme to verify if a particular sequence satisfies certain selection criteria. Our claims could be seen as a special case of the Schwartz-Zippel theorem applied to counting queries [46] . In the following theo- 
This implies that if the query is not satisfied, our algebraic formula is equal to zero with probability 1/(n − 1). The aforementioned observation enables the calculation of count queries on the encrypted SNP data. Basically to check whether θ h i satisfies a certain query, we need to check whether (S(i) 
